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There are relatively few proposals for inconsistency measures for propositional belief bases.
However inconsistency measures are potentially as important as information measures for
artiﬁcial intelligence, and more generally for computer science. In particular, they can be
useful to deﬁne various operators for belief revision, belief merging, and negotiation. The
measures that have been proposed so far can be split into two classes. The ﬁrst class of
measures takes into account the number of formulae required to produce an inconsistency:
the more formulae required to produce an inconsistency, the less inconsistent the base.
The second class takes into account the proportion of the language that is affected by the
inconsistency: the more propositional variables affected, the more inconsistent the base.
Both approaches are sensible, but there is no proposal for combining them. We address
this need in this paper: our proposal takes into account both the number of variables
affected by the inconsistency and the distribution of the inconsistency among the formulae
of the base. Our idea is to use existing inconsistency measures in order to deﬁne a game
in coalitional form, and then to use the Shapley value to obtain an inconsistency measure
that indicates the responsibility/contribution of each formula to the overall inconsistency
in the base. This allows us to provide a more reliable image of the belief base and of the
inconsistency in it.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
There are numerous works on reasoning under inconsistency. One can quote for example paraconsistent logics, argu-
mentation frameworks, belief revision and fusion, etc. All these approaches illustrate the fact that the dichotomy between
consistent and inconsistent sets of formulae that comes from classical logics is not suﬃcient for describing these sets. As
shown by these works, normally when given two inconsistent sets of formulae, they are not trivially equivalent. They do
not contain the same information and they do not contain the same contradictions.
Measures of information à la Shannon have been studied in logical frameworks (see for example [31]). Roughly they
involve counting the number of models of the set of formulae (the less models, the more informative the set). The problem
is that these measures regard an inconsistent set of formulae as having a null information content, which is counter-intuitive
(especially given all the proposals for paraconsistent reasoning). So generalizations of measures of information have been
proposed to solve this problem [39,53,36,32,24].
In comparison, there are relatively few proposals for inconsistency measures [22,27,35,32,28,18]. However, these mea-
sures are potentially important in diverse applications in artiﬁcial intelligence, such as belief revision, belief merging, and
negotiation, and more generally in computer science. Already some provisional studies indicate that measuring inconsistency
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straints [18], software speciﬁcations [9,10,42], and ecommerce protocols [12].
The current proposals for measuring inconsistency can be classiﬁed in two approaches. The ﬁrst approach involves
“counting” the minimal number of formulae needed to produce the inconsistency. The more formulae needed to produce
the inconsistency, the less inconsistent the set [35]. This idea is an interesting one, but it rejects the possibility of a more
ﬁne-grained inspection of the (content of the) formulae. In particular, if one looks to singleton sets only, one is back to the
initial problem, with only two values: consistent or inconsistent.
The second approach involves looking at the proportion of the language that is touched by the inconsistency. This allows
us to look inside the formulae [27,32,18]. This means that two formulae viewed as two whole belief bases (singleton sets)
can have different inconsistency measures. But, in these approaches one can identify the set of formulae with its conjunction
(i.e. the set {ϕ,ϕ′} has the same inconsistency measure as the set {ϕ ∧ ϕ′}). This can be sensible in some applications, but
this means that the distribution of the contradiction among the formulae is not taken into account.
What we propose in this paper is a deﬁnition for inconsistency measures that allow us to take the best of the two
approaches. This will allow us to build inconsistency measures that are able to look inside the formulae, but also to take
into account the distribution of the contradiction among the different formulae of the set.
The above-mentioned approaches deﬁne inconsistency measures, i.e. functions that associate a number to each belief base.
These global base-level measures are suﬃcient for a variety of applications. But in some cases we need an evaluation on
a ﬁner level, that is for each formula of the base. We call these functions, that associate a number to each formula of a
base, inconsistency values. Such a function allows us to identify which are the most problematic formulae of a belief base
with respect to the inconsistency. This can be very useful for applications such as belief revision or negotiation. These
inconsistency values provide a more detailed view of the inconsistency, and they can be used to deﬁned new inconsistency
measures which more accurately reﬂect the inconsistency of the whole base.
To this end we will use a notion that comes from coalitional game theory: the Shapley value. This value assigns to
each player the payoff that this player can expect from her utility for each possible coalition. The idea is to use existing
inconsistency measures (that allow us to look inside the formulae) in order to deﬁne a game in coalitional form, and then
to use the Shapley value to obtain an inconsistency measure with the desired properties. From these inconsistency values, it
is possible to deﬁne new interesting inconsistency measures. We present these measures, we state a set of logical properties
they satisfy, and we show that they are more interesting than the other existing measures.
The plan of the paper is as follows: After some preliminaries in the next section, Section 3 introduces inconsistency
measures that count the number of formulae needed to produce an inconsistency. Section 4 presents the approaches where
the inconsistency measure depends on the number of variables touched by the inconsistency. Section 5 introduces the
problem studied in this paper and illustrates that the naive solution is not adequate. Section 6 gives the deﬁnition of
coalitional games and of the Shapley value. Section 7 introduces the inconsistency measures based on Shapley value. Then
we study the logical properties of these measures in Section 8, and we provide a complete axiomatization of a particular
measure in Section 9 through a set of intuitive axioms. Section 10 sketches the possible applications of those measures for
reasoning and for belief change operators. Finally Section 11 concludes by giving perspectives of this work and its possible
applications for belief change operators.
2. Preliminaries
We will consider a propositional language L built from a ﬁnite set of propositional symbols P . We will use a,b, c, . . . to
denote the propositional variables, and Greek letters α,β,ϕ, . . . to denote the formulae. An interpretation is a total function
from P to {0,1}. The set of all interpretations is denoted W . An interpretation ω is a model of a formula ϕ , denoted ω | ϕ ,
if and only if it makes ϕ true in the usual truth-functional way. Mod(ϕ) denotes the set of models of the formula ϕ , i.e.
Mod(ϕ) = {ω ∈ W | ω | ϕ}. We will use ⊆ to denote the set inclusion, and we will use ⊂ to denote the strict set inclusion,
i.e. A ⊂ B iff A ⊆ B and B  A. Let A and B be two subsets of C , we note C = A ⊕ B if A and B form a partition of C, i.e.
C = A ⊕ B iff C = A ∪ B and A ∩ B = ∅. We will denote the set of real numbers by R.
A belief base K is a ﬁnite set of propositional formulae. More exactly, as we will need to identify the different formulae
of a belief base in order to associate them with their inconsistency value, we will consider belief bases K as vectors of
formulae. For logical properties we will need to use the set corresponding to each vector, so we suppose that there is a
function mapping each vector K = (α1, . . . ,αn) into K¯ , the set {α1, . . . ,αn}. As it will never be ambigous, in the following
we will omit the graphical distinction and write K as both the vector and the set.
Let us note KL the set of belief bases deﬁnable from formulae of the language L. A belief base is consistent if there is
at least one interpretation that satisﬁes all its formulae.
If a belief base K is not consistent, then one can deﬁne the minimal inconsistent subsets of K as:
MI(K ) = {K ′ ⊆ K ∣∣ K ′  ⊥ and ∀K ′′ ⊂ K ′, K ′′  ⊥}
If one wants to recover consistency from an inconsistent base K by removing some formulae, then the minimal incon-
sistent subsets can be considered as the purest form of inconsistency. To recover consistency, one has to remove at least
one formula from each minimal inconsistent subset [49]. The notion of maximal consistent subset is the dual of that of
A. Hunter, S. Konieczny / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 1007–1026 1009minimal inconsistent subset. Each maximal consistent subset represents a maximal (by set inclusion) subset of the base
that is consistent.
MC(K ) = {K ′ ⊆ K ∣∣ K ′  ⊥ and ∀K ′′ s.t. K ′ ⊂ K ′′, K ′′  ⊥}
A free formula of a belief base K is a formula of K that does not belong to any minimal inconsistent subset of the belief
base K , or equivalently a formula that belongs to every maximal consistent subset of the belief base. This means that this
formula has nothing to do with the conﬂicts of the base.
3. Inconsistency measures based on formulae
When a base is inconsistent the classical inference relation is trivialized, since one can deduce every formula of the lan-
guage from the base (ex falso quodlibet). To address this problem, paraconsistent reasoning techniques have been developed
to only allow non-trivial consequences to follow from an inconsistent base. There is a range of paraconsistent systems, each
based on a weakening of classical reasoning. One approach is a very straightforward weakening that only allows inferences
from consistent subsets of a base rather than from the whole base (e.g. [43,4,45]).
Paraconsistent reasoning systems provide a natural starting point for analysing inconsistency. One interesting option is
to analyse inconsistency in terms of the maximal consistent subsets of the base. So one can use for instance the size (or the
number) of those maximal consistent subsets as a measure of the inconsistency. Indeed analysis of the maximal consistent
subsets of a base is the basis of the measure of inconsistency proposed by Knight [35,36] which we review next.
Deﬁnition 1. A probability function on L is a function P : L → [0,1] s.t.:
• if | α, then P (α) = 1.
• if | ¬(α ∧ β), then P (α ∨ β) = P (α)+ P (β).
See [46] for more details on this deﬁnition. In the ﬁnite case, this deﬁnition gives a probability distribution on the
interpretations, and the probability of a formula is the sum of the probability of its models.
Then the inconsistency measure deﬁned by Knight [35] is given by:
Deﬁnition 2. Let K be a belief base.
• K is η-consistent (0 η 1) if there is a probability function P such that P (α) η for all α ∈ K .
• K is maximally η-consistent if η is maximal (i.e. if γ > η then K is not γ -consistent).
As is easily seen, in the ﬁnite case, a belief base is maximally 0-consistent if and only if it contains a contradictory
formula. And a belief base is maximally 1-consistent if and only if it is consistent.
The notion of maximal η-consistency can be used as an inconsistency measure. This is the direct formulation of the idea
that the more formulae are needed to produce the inconsistency, the less this inconsistency is problematic. Let us illustrate
this on the following “lottery example”:
Example 1. There are a number of lottery tickets with one of them being the winning ticket. Suppose wi denotes ticket i will
win, then we have the assumption w1 ∨ · · · ∨ wn . In addition, for each ticket i, we may pessimistically (or probabilistically
if the number of tickets is important) assume that it will not win, and this is represented by the assumption ¬wi . So the
base KL is:
KL = {¬w1, . . . ,¬wn,w1 ∨ · · · ∨ wn}
Clearly if there are three or two (or one!) tickets in the lottery, then this base is highly inconsistent. But if there are
millions of tickets there is intuitively (nearly) no conﬂict in the base. This is expressed by the η-consistency measure, since
the base KL is maximally (n − 1)/n-consistent.1 So with three tickets the base is maximally 2/3-consistent, and with a
million tickets we are very close to maximally 1-consistent.
Example 2. Let K1 = {a,b,¬a ∨ ¬b}. Since, we can reﬂect a distribution over models by P (a ∧ b) = 13 , P (a ∧ ¬b) = 13 , and
P (¬a ∧ b) = 13 . We get P (a) = 23 , P (b) = 23 , and P (¬a ∨ ¬b) = 23 . As a result, K1 is maximally 23 -consistent.
Let K2 = {a ∧ b,¬a ∧ ¬b,a ∧ ¬b}. K2 is maximally 13 -consistent, whereas each subbase of cardinality 2 is maximally
1
2 -consistent.
1 Unless stated otherwise, we consider in the examples that the set of propositional symbols P of the language is exactly the set of propositional symbols
that appear in the base K .
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Proposition 1. (See [35].) If K ′ ∈ MI(K ), then K ′ is maximally |K ′|−1|K ′| -consistent.
But in general this measure is harder to compute than the case considered above. However it is possible to compute it
using the simplex method [35].
4. Inconsistency measures based on variables
Another method to evaluate the inconsistency of a belief base is to look at the proportion of the language concerned
with the inconsistency. To this end, it is clearly not possible to use classical logics, since the inconsistency contaminates the
whole language. But if we look at the two bases K3 = {a∧ ¬a∧ b ∧ c ∧ d} and K4 = {a∧ ¬a∧ b ∧ ¬b ∧ c ∧ ¬c ∧ d∧ ¬d}, we
can observe that in K3 the inconsistency is mainly about the variable a, whereas in K4 all the variables are touched by a
contradiction. This is the kind of distinction that these approaches allow.
One way to circumscribe the inconsistency only to the variables directly concerned is to use multi-valued logics, and
especially three-valued logics, with the third “truth value” denoting the fact that there is a conﬂict on the truth value
(true–false) of the variable.
We do not have space here to detail the range of different measures that have been proposed. See [22,27,32,24,18] for
more details on these approaches. We only give one such measure, that is a special case of the degrees of contradiction
deﬁned in [32]. The idea of the deﬁnition of these degrees in [32] is, given a set of tests on the truth value of some
formulae of the language (typically on the variables), the degree of contradiction is the cost of a minimum test plan that
ensures recovery of consistency.
The inconsistency measure we deﬁne here is the (normalized) minimum number of inconsistent truth values in the LPm
models [48] of the belief base. Let us ﬁrst introduce the LPm consequence relation.
• An interpretation ω for LPm maps each propositional atom to one of the three “truth values” F,B,T, the third truth
value B meaning intuitively “both true and false”. 3P is the set of all interpretations for LPm . “Truth values” are ordered
as follows: F <t B <t T. The interpretations are extended to formulae as follows:
– ω() = T, ω(⊥) = F – ω(α ∧ β) =mint (ω(α),ω(β))
– ω(¬α) = B iff ω(α) = B
– ω(¬α) = T iff ω(α) = F – ω(α ∨ β) =maxt (ω(α),ω(β))
• The set of models of a formula ϕ is:
ModLP(ϕ) =
{
ω ∈ 3P ∣∣ω(ϕ) ∈ {T,B}}
Deﬁne ω! as the set of “inconsistent” variables in an interpretation ω, i.e.
ω! = {x ∈ P ∣∣ω(x) = B}
Then the minimal models of a formula are the “most classical” ones (i.e. the models with the largest subset by set
inclusion of atoms assigned either T or F):
min
(
ModLP(ϕ)
)= {ω ∈ ModLP(ϕ) ∣∣ ω′ ∈ ModLP(ϕ) s.t. ω′! ⊂ ω!}
The LPm consequence relation is then deﬁned by:
K |LPm ϕ iff min
(
ModLP(K )
)⊆ModLP(ϕ)
So ϕ is a consequence of K if all the “most classical” models of K are models of ϕ .
Then let us deﬁne the LPm measure of inconsistency [32], noted ILPm , as:
Deﬁnition 3. Let K be a belief base. ILPm (K ) = minω∈ModLP (K ){|ω!|}|P| .
So, with ILPm , the measure of inconsistency of a base is basically the number of “inconsistent” variables in the most
classical models.
Example 3. K5 = {a ∧ ¬a,b,¬b, c}. The “most classical” LP model of K5 is ω with ω(a) = B, ω(b) = B, ω(c) = T. So with 2
of the 3 variables being B, this gives ILPm (K5) = 2 .3
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this base is maximally 0-consistent because of the contradictory formula a ∧ ¬a. But there are also non-trivial formulae in
the base, and this base is not totally inconsistent according to ILPm .
Conversely, measures based on variables like this one are unable to take into account the distribution of the contradiction
among formulae. In fact the result would be exactly the same with K ′5 = {a∧¬a∧ b∧¬b∧ c}. This can be sensible in some
applications, but in some cases this can also be seen as a drawback. In particular when the formulae represent different
pieces of information (that can come from different sources for instance). See [34] for a related discussion.
5. Dimensions for measuring inconsistency
From the discussion in the previous sections, we can regard the measures of propositional inconsistency (so far) as falling
into one or other of the following two classes.
Formula-centric measures These measures take into account the number of formulae required for inconsistency: Fewer
formulae means higher degree of inconsistency. This is exempliﬁed by the notion of η-consistent.
Atom-centric measures These measures take into account the proportion of the language affected by inconsistency: More
propositional variables involved in inconsistency means higher degree of inconsistency. This is exempliﬁed by the
ILPm measure of inconsistency.
We can also note that the measures deﬁned in the previous sections provide a measure of inconsistency for the whole
base. But we can consider another type of measure, and this leads us to the following two classes of measures.
Inconsistency measures (Base-level measures) These measures provide a measure of inconsistency to the beliefbase as a
whole. They do not assign a measure of inconsistency to individual formulae.
Inconsistency values (Formula-level measures) These values provide a measure of inconsistency to the formulae in a be-
liefbase, and in a sense assign the degree of blame or responsibility that can be ascribed to the formulae for the
inconsistencies arising in the beliefbase.
The measures reviewed up to now are all inconsistency measures (base-level measures). The aim of this paper is to
present and investigate inconsistency values (formula-level measures), and to show that they can be very useful for a lot of
reasoning applications such as belief revision, inference, negotiation, etc.
In order to explore the notion of an inconsistency value, we ﬁrst consider a simple option for such a value.
Deﬁnition 4. For an inconsistency measure on beliefbases, I : ℘(L) → [0,1], a base K ⊆ L and α ∈ K , the simple assignment
to formulae, MKI : L → [0,1], is as follows,
MKI (α) = I(K ) − I
(
K \ {α})
Let us see an example when we take as inconsistency measure the simplest possible option:
Deﬁnition 5. The drastic inconsistency value is deﬁned as:
Id(K ) =
{
0 if K is consistent
1 otherwise
Example 4. For this example, let us use the drastic inconsistency value Id , and consider K6 = {a,a ∧ b,¬a}. Hence, we get
the following.
MKId (a) = 0, MKId (a ∧ b) = 0, MKId (¬a) = 1
In this example, we see that all the blame is assigned to the formula that is in both minimal inconsistent subsets, and
none is assigned to either of the formulae which appear in only one of the minimal inconsistent subsets. This is clearly a
signiﬁcant shortcoming with the simple assignment since at least some of the blame should be assigned to a and to a ∧ b,
and hence they should each have a non-zero evaluation.
We see in the following example that by taking a more reﬁned inconsistency measure on beliefbases, we get a better
assignment to formulae.
Deﬁnition 6. The MI inconsistency measure is deﬁned as the number of minimal inconsistent sets of K , i.e.:
IMI(K ) =
∣∣MI(K )∣∣
1012 A. Hunter, S. Konieczny / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 1007–1026Example 5. K6 = {a,a ∧ b,¬a}. Hence, we get the following.
MKIMI (a) = 1, MKIMI (a ∧ b) = 1, MKIMI (¬a) = 2
However, even with this more reﬁned inconsistency measure on beliefbases, we still can ﬁnd problematical examples,
such as the “lottery example” (Example 1). Let us see what this example gives here:
Example 6. For this example, let IMI(K ) = |MI(K )| and let
KL = {¬w1, . . . ,¬wn,w1 ∨ · · · ∨ wn}
Hence, for each α ∈ KL , we get MKIMI (α) = 1.
The problem with the above example is that as n increases, we expect the assignment to each individual formula should
decrease. Moreover, we want the distribution to individual formulae to be undertaken according to some well-understood
principles. In other words, we do not want an “ad hoc” distribution. To address this need, we turn to game theory in the
next section to provide a well-behaved and principled solution.
6. Games in coalitional form – Shapley value
In this section we give the deﬁnitions of games in coalitional form and of the Shapley value.
Deﬁnition 7. Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be a set of n players. A game in coalitional form is given by a function v : 2N → R, with
v(∅) = 0.
This framework deﬁnes games in a very abstract way, focusing on the possible coalition formations. A coalition is just
a subset of N . This function gives what payoff can be achieved by each coalition in the game v when all its members act
together as a unit.
There are numerous questions that are worthwhile to investigate in this framework. One of these questions is to know
how much each player can expect in a given game v . This depends on her position in the game, i.e. what she brings to
different coalitions.
Often the games are super-additive.
Deﬁnition 8. A game is super-additive if for each T ,U ⊆ N with T ∩ U = ∅,
v(T ∪ U ) v(T ) + v(U )
In super-additive games when two coalitions join, then the joined coalition wins at least as much as (the sum of) the
initials coalitions. In particular, in super-additive games, the grand coalition N is the one that brings the higher utility for
the society N . The problem is how this utility can be shared among the players.2
Example 7. Let N = {1,2,3}, and let v be the following coalitional game:
v
({1})= 1 v({2})= 0 v({3})= 1
v
({1,2})= 10 v({1,3})= 4 v({2,3})= 11
v
({1,2,3})= 12
This game is clearly super-additive. The grand coalition can bring 12 to the three players. This is the highest utility
achievable by the group. But this is not the main aim for all the players. In particular one can note that two coalitions can
bring nearly as much, namely {1,2} and {2,3} that gives respectively 10 and 11, that will have to be shared only between
2 players. So it is far from certain that the grand coalition will form in this case. Another remark on this game is that all
the players do not share the same situation. In particular player 2 is always of a great value for any coalition she joins. So
she seems to be able to expect more from this game than the other players. For example she can make an offer to player 3
for making the coalition {2,3}, that brings 11, that will be split into 8 for player 2 and 3 for player 3. As it will be hard for
player 3 to win more than that, she will certainly accept.
A solution concept has to take into account these kinds of arguments. It means that one wants to solve this game by
stating what is the payoff that is “due” to each agent. That requires being able to quantify the payoff that an agent can
2 One supposes the transferable utility (TU) assumption, i.e. the utility is a common unit between the players and sharable as needed (roughly, one can
see this utility as some kind of money).
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payoff of the coalitions she joins, if she can threaten to form another coalition, etc.).
Deﬁnition 9. A value is a function that assigns to each game v a vector S(v) in Rn . Si(v) stands for player i’s payoff in the
game.
This function gives the payoff that can be expected by each player i for the game v , i.e. it measures i’s power in the
game v .
Shapley proposes a beautiful solution to this problem [50]. Basically the idea can be explained as follows: considering
that the coalitions form according to some order (a ﬁrst player enters the coalition, then another one, then a third one,
etc.), and that the payoff attached to a player is its marginal utility (i.e. the utility that it brings to the existing coalition),
so if C is a coalition (subset of N) not containing i, player’s i marginal utility is v(C ∪ {i}) − v(C). As one cannot make
any hypothesis on which order is the correct one, suppose that each order is equally probable. This leads to the following
deﬁnition of the Shapley value of a game. For this deﬁnition, let σ be a permutation on N , with σn denoting all the possible
permutations on N . Let us note
piσ =
{
j ∈ N ∣∣ σ( j) < σ(i)}
That means that piσ represents all the players that precede player i for a given order σ .
Deﬁnition 10. The Shapley value of a game v is deﬁned as:
Si(v) = 1
n!
∑
σ∈σn
v
(
piσ ∪ {i}
)− v(piσ )
The Shapley value can be directly computed from the possible coalitions (without looking at the permutations), with the
following expression [50]:
Si(v) =
∑
C⊆N
(c − 1)!(n − c)!
n!
(
v(C) − v(C \ {i}))
where c is the cardinality of C .
Example 8. The Shapley value of the game deﬁned in Example 7 is ( 176 ,
35
6 ,
20
6 ).
These values show that it is player 2 that is the best placed in this game, according to what we explained when we
presented Example 7.
Besides this value, Shapley proposes axiomatic properties a value should have.
• ∑i∈N Si(v) = v(N) (Eﬃciency)
• If i and j are such that for all C s.t. i, j /∈ C , v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C ∪ { j}), then Si(v) = S j(v) (Symmetry)
• If i is such that ∀C v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C), then Si(v) = 0 (Dummy)
• Si(v + w) = Si(v) + Si(w) (Additivity)
These four axioms seem quite sensible. Eﬃciency states that the payoff available to the grand coalition N must be
eﬃciently redistributed to the players (otherwise some players could expect more than what they have). Symmetry ensures
that it is the role of the player in the game in coalitional form that determines her payoff, so it is not possible to distinguish
players by their name (as far as payoffs are concerned), but only by their respective merits/possibilities. So if two players
always are identical for the game, i.e. if they bring the same utility to every coalition, then they have the same value. The
dummy player axiom says simply that if a player is of no use for any coalition, this player does not deserve any payoff. And
additivity states that when we join two different games v and w in a whole super-game v + w (v + w is straightforwardly
deﬁned as the function that is the sum of the two functions v and w , that means that each coalition receives as payoff in
the game v + w the payoff it has in v plus the payoff it has in w), then the value of each player in the supergame is simply
the sum of the values in the compound games.
These properties look quite natural, and the nice result shown by Shapley is that they characterize exactly the value he
deﬁned [50]:
Proposition 2. The Shapley value is the only value that satisﬁes all of Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Dummy and Additivity.
This result supports several variations: there are other equivalent axiomatizations of the Shapley value, and there are
some different values that can be deﬁned by relaxing some of the above axioms (see [2]).
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Given an inconsistency measure, the idea is to take it as the payoff function deﬁning a game in coalitional form, and
then using the Shapley value to compute the part of the inconsistency that can be imputed to each formula of the belief
base.
This allows us to combine the power of inconsistency measures based on variables and hence discriminating between
singleton inconsistent belief base (like the test action values of [32], or the Inc measure in [18]), and the use of the Shapley
value for knowing what is the responsibility of a given formula in the inconsistency of the belief base.
We just require some basic properties on the underlying inconsistency measure.
Deﬁnition 11. An inconsistency measure I is called a basic inconsistency measure if it satisﬁes the following properties,
∀K , K ′ ∈ KL , ∀α,β ∈ L:
• I(K ) = 0 iff K is consistent (Consistency)
• I(K ∪ K ′) I(K ) (Monotony)
• If α is a free formula of K , then I(K ) = I(K \ {α}) (Free formula independence)
• If α  β and α  ⊥, then I(K ∪ {α}) I(K ∪ {β}) (Dominance)
We ask for few properties on the underlying inconsistency measure. The Consistency property states that a consistent
base has a null inconsistency measure. The Monotony property says that the amount of inconsistency of a belief base can
only grow if one adds new formulae (deﬁned on the same language). The free formula independence property states that
adding a formula that does not cause any inconsistency cannot change the inconsistency measure of the base. The Domi-
nance property states that logically stronger formulae bring (potentially) more conﬂicts. Note, for the Dominance property,
the condition that α is consistent ensures that β is not trivially implied by α and therefore not trivially adding more
inconsistency to 
 than α.
We could also ask for the following Normalization property of the inconsistency measure, as it can be used for simpliﬁ-
cation purposes. However, we do not regard it as mandatory.
• 0 I(K ) 1 (Normalization)
Now we are able to deﬁne the Shapley Inconsistency Value.
Deﬁnition 12. Let I be a basic inconsistency measure. We deﬁne the corresponding Shapley Inconsistency Value (SIV),
noted S I , as the Shapley value of the coalitional game deﬁned by the function I , i.e. let α ∈ K :
S Iα(K ) =
∑
C⊆K
(c − 1)!(n − c)!
n!
(
I(C) − I(C \ {α}))
where n is the cardinality of K and c is the cardinality of C .
Note that this SIV gives a value for each formula of the base K , so if one considers the base K as the vector K =
(α1, . . . ,αn), then we will use S I (K ) to denote the vector of corresponding SIVs, i.e.
S I (K ) = (S Iα1(K ), . . . , S Iαn (K ))
This deﬁnition allows us to deﬁne to what extent a formula inside a belief base is concerned with the inconsistencies of
the base. It allows us to draw a precise picture of the contradictions occurring in the base.
From this value, one can deﬁne an inconsistency value for the whole belief base as in the next deﬁnition which essen-
tially says that a base is as bad as its worst element.
Deﬁnition 13. Let K be a belief base, Sˆ I (K ) =maxα∈K S Iα(K ).
One can identify other aggregation functions to deﬁne the inconsistency measure of the belief base from the inconsis-
tency measure of its formulae, such as the leximax for instance. Leximax is a reﬁnement of max, and roughly it consists
in ordering the set of values in a decreasing order, and to compare the ordered lists lexicographically. See [33] for instance
for a formal deﬁnition. Taking the maximum will be suﬃcient for us to have valuable results and to compare this with the
existing measures from the literature. Note that taking the sum as the aggregation function is not a good choice here, since
as shown by the Distribution property of Proposition 6 this equals I(K ), “erasing” the use of the Shapley value.
We think that the most interesting measure is S I , since it describes more accurately the inconsistency of the base. But
we deﬁne Sˆ I since it is a more concise measure, and since it is of the same type as existing ones (it associates a real to
each base), that is convenient to compare our framework with existing measures.
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7.1. Drastic Shapley Inconsistency Value
We will start this section with the simplest inconsistency measure one can deﬁne, that is the drastic inconsistency value
of Deﬁnition 5:
Id(K ) =
{
0 if K is consistent
1 otherwise
This measure is not of great interest by itself, since it corresponds to the usual dichotomy of classical logic. But it will be
useful to illustrate the use of the Shapley Inconsistency Values, since, even with this over-simple measure, one will produce
interesting results.
Proposition 3. The drastic inconsistency value is a basic inconsistency measure.
Let us now illustrate the behaviour of this value on some examples.
Example 9. K7 = {a,¬a,b}. As b is a free formula, it has a value of 0, the two other formulae are equally responsible for
the inconsistency. Then Id({a,¬a}) = Id({a,¬a,b}) = 1, and the value is S Id (K7) = ( 12 , 12 ,0). So Sˆ Id (K7) = 12 .
Example 10. K8 = {a,b,b ∧ c,¬b ∧ d}. The last three formulae are the ones that belong to some inconsistency, and the last
one is the one that causes the most problems (indeed removing only this formula restores the consistency of the base). As
a result, the value is S Id (K8) = (0, 16 , 16 , 46 ). And Sˆ Id (K8) = 23 .
Example 11. K5 = {a ∧ ¬a,b,¬b, c}. The value is S Id (K5) = ( 46 , 16 , 16 ,0). So Sˆ Id (K5) = 23 .
Contradictory formulae (like a ∧ ¬a) are the most problematical ones, but they are not the only source of conﬂict in the
base. This is exactly what is expressed in the values obtained in the above example.
7.2. MI Shapley Inconsistency Value
We now consider another syntactic inconsistency measure which, in a sense, is sensitive to the “number of conﬂicts” in
the base. That is the MI inconsistency measure deﬁned in Deﬁnition 6:
IMI(K ) =
∣∣MI(K )∣∣
So this measure evaluates the amount of conﬂict of the base as the number of minimal inconsistent subsets of this base,
so it computes in a sense the number of different conﬂict points in the base.
It is easy to check that:
Proposition 4. The MI inconsistency measure is a basic inconsistency measure.
Let us illustrate the behaviour of this value on some examples.
Example 12. K7 = {a,¬a,b}. As b is a free formula, it has a value of 0, the two other formulae are equally responsible for
the inconsistency. Then IMI({a,¬a}) = IMI({a,¬a,b}) = 1, and the value is S IMI (K7) = ( 12 , 12 ,0). So Sˆ IMI (K7) = 12 .
Example 13. K8 = {a,b,b ∧ c,¬b ∧ d}. The last three formulae are the ones that belong to some inconsistency, and the
last one is the one that causes the most problems (removing only this formula restores the consistency). Then the value is
S IMI (K8) = (0, 12 , 12 ,1). So Sˆ IMI (K8) = 1.
Example 14. K5 = {a ∧ ¬a,b,¬b, c}. The value is S IMI (K5) = (1, 12 , 12 ,0). So Sˆ IMI (K5) = 1.
Example 15. K9 = {a ∧ ¬a,b,¬b ∧ c,¬b ∧ d}. The value is S IMI (K9) = (1,1, 12 , 12 ). So Sˆ IMI (K9) = 1.
The last two examples above show that this measure is very sensitive to contradictory formulae, since as soon as the
base contains a contradictory formula, the inconsistency measure of the base is maximum.
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Example 17. K11 = {a,¬a ∧ b,¬a ∨ c,¬c}. The value is S IMI (K11) = ( 56 , 12 , 13 , 13 ). So Sˆ IMI (K11) = 56 .
7.3. LPm Shapley Inconsistency Value
Let us turn now to a value that use the ILPm inconsistency measure (deﬁned Section 4).
Unfortunately the ILPm inconsistency measure is not a basic inconsistency measure, since it does not satisfy the free
formula independence property. Let us show this on an example.
Example 18. Consider K16 = {((a ∧ ¬b) ∨ (b ∧ a ∧ ¬a)) ∧ c ∧ ¬c} and α = b. α is a free formula of K16 ∪ {α} since the
unique formula of K16 is already a contradiction, but it increases the inconsistency value since ILPm (K16) = 13 , whereas
ILPm (K16 ∪ {α}) = 23 .
To not satisfy free formula independence is problematic since this property expresses a kind of independence between
the amount of information and the amount of contradiction of a base. The aim is to ensure that adding new formulas that
do not enter into any contradiction/conﬂict do not change the inconsistency measure.
On the other hand, one argument against free formula independence is that it considers the contradiction/conﬂict only
at the level of the subsets (since being a free formula means that it does not introduce any new minimal inconsistent
subset). What the previous example shows is that a formula that does not induce any minimal inconsistent subset can still
increase the conﬂicts in existing minimal inconsistent subsets.
So, in some cases, this property can be considered as too strong. To address this, we can deﬁne a weaker family of
inconsistency measures.
Deﬁnition 14. For α ∈ K , α is a safe formula in K iff Atoms(α)∩ Atoms(K ) = ∅ and α  ⊥.
Using this deﬁnition, we can introduce the following property of safe formula independence (also called weak indepen-
dence by Thimm [52]).
• If α is a safe formula of K , then I(K ) = I(K \ {α}) (Safe formula independence)
Obviously safe formula independence is a (logically) weaker notion than free formula independence. The idea is similar,
meaning that if we add new pieces of information that have no relation with the existing conﬂicts of the base, then the
inconsistency measure does not change.
Deﬁnition 15. An inconsistency measure I is called a weak inconsistency measure if it satisﬁes consistency, monotony,
dominance, and safe formula independence.
So now we can show that:
Proposition 5. The ILPm inconsistency measure is a weak inconsistency measure.
Now let us see the behaviour of this value on some examples.
Example 19. Let K5 = {a ∧ ¬a,b,¬b, c} and K ′5 = {a ∧ ¬a ∧ b ∧ ¬b ∧ c}.
Then S ILPm (K5) = ( 13 , 16 , 16 ,0), and Sˆ ILPm (K5) = 13 .
Whereas S ILPm (K ′5) = ( 23 ) and Sˆ ILPm (K ′5) = 23 .
As we can see on this example, the SIV value allows us to make a distinction between K5 and K ′5, since Sˆ ILPm (K ′5) = 23
whereas Sˆ ILPm (K5) = 13 . This illustrates the fact that the inconsistency is more distributed in K5 than in K ′5. This distinction
is not possible with the original ILPm value. Note that with Knight’s coherence value one cannot distinguish the two bases
either, since the two bases have the worst inconsistency value (maximally 0-consistent).
So this example illustrates the improvement brought by this work, compared to inconsistency measures on formulae and
to inconsistency measures on variables, since neither of them was able to make a distinction between K5 and K ′5, whereas
for Sˆ ILPm K5 is more consistent than K ′5.
Let us see a more striking example.
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Then S ILPm (K12) = (0, 118 , 418 , 718 ), and Sˆ ILPm (K12) = 718 .
In this example one can easily see that it is the last formula that is the most problematic, and that b ∧ c brings more
conﬂict than b alone, which is perfectly expressed in the obtained values.
8. Logical properties of SIV
Let us see now some properties of the deﬁned values.
Proposition 6. Assume a given basic inconsistency measure I . Every Shapley Inconsistency Value S I satisﬁes:
• ∑α∈K S Iα(K ) = I(K ) (Distribution)
• If α,β ∈ K are such that for all K ′ ⊆ K s.t. α,β /∈ K ′ , I(K ′ ∪ {α}) = I(K ′ ∪ {β}), then S Iα(K ) = S Iβ(K ) (Symmetry)
• If α is a free formula of K , then S Iα(K ) = 0 (Minimality)
• If α  β and α  ⊥, then S Iα(K ) S Iβ(K ) (Dominance)
The Distribution property states that the inconsistency values of the formulae sum to the total amount of inconsistency
in the base (I(K )). The Symmetry property ensures that only the amount of inconsistency brought by a formula matters
for computing the SIV. As one would expect, a formula that is not embedded in any contradiction (i.e. does not belong to
any minimal inconsistent subset) will not be blamed by the Shapley Inconsistency Values. This is what is expressed in the
Minimality property. The Dominance property states that logically stronger formulae bring (potentially) more conﬂicts.
The ﬁrst three properties are a restatement in this logical framework of the properties of the Shapley value. One can
note that the Additivity axiom of the Shapley value is not translated here, since it makes little sense to add different
inconsistency values that are two different views of the same subject: It is like trying to add the temperature of an object
measured in degrees Fahrenheit to the temperature of the same object measured in degrees Celsius. We will elaborate more
on this point in the next section.
Let us turn now to the properties of the measure on belief bases.
Proposition 7.
• Sˆ I (K ) = 0 if and only if K is consistent (Consistency)
• If α is a free formula of K ∪ {α}, then Sˆ I (K ∪ {α}) = Sˆ I (K ) (Free formula independence)
• Sˆ I (K ) I(K ) (Upper bound)
• Sˆ I (K ) = I(K ) > 0 if and only if ∃α ∈ K s.t. α is inconsistent and ∀β ∈ K , β = α, β is a free formula of K (Isolation)
The ﬁrst two properties are the ones given in Deﬁnition 11 for the basic inconsistency measures. As one can easily note
an important difference is that the Monotony property and the Dominance property do not hold for the SIVs on belief bases.
It is sensible since distribution of the inconsistencies matters for SIVs. The Upper bound property shows that the use of the
SIV aims at looking at the distribution of the inconsistencies of the base, so the SIV on belief bases is always less or equal
to the inconsistency measure given by the underlying basic inconsistency measure. The Isolation property details the case
where the two measures are equals. In this case, there is only one inconsistent formula in the whole base, and all the other
formulas are jointly consistent.
Let us see, on Example 21, counter-examples to monotony and dominance for SIV on belief bases:
Example 21. Let
K13 = {a,¬a,¬a ∧ b}
K14 = {a,¬a,¬a ∧ b,a ∧ b}
and
K15 = {a,¬a,¬a ∧ b,b}
We then obtain:
S Id (K13) =
(
2
,
1
,
1
)
, S Id (K14) =
(
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
)
, and S Id (K15) =
(
2
,
1
,
1
,0
)
3 6 6 4 4 4 4 3 6 6
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Sˆ Id (K13) = 2
3
, Sˆ Id (K14) = 1
4
, Sˆ Id (K15) = 2
3
This example shows that monotony is not satisﬁed by SIV on belief bases. Clearly K13 ⊂ K14, but Sˆ Id (K13) > Sˆ Id (K14).
This is explained by the fact that the inconsistency is more diluted in K14 than in K13. In K13 the formula a is the one that
is the most blamed for the inconsistency (S Ida (K13) = Sˆ Id (K13) = 23 ), since it appears in all inconsistent sets. Whereas in K14
inconsistencies are equally caused by a and by a ∧ b, that decreases the responsibility of a, and the whole inconsistency
value of the base.
For a similar reason dominance is not satisﬁed, we clearly have a ∧ b  b (and a ∧ b  ⊥), but Sˆ Id (K14) < Sˆ Id (K15).
9. Logical characterization of S IMI
In this section we give a complete characterization of the Shapley Inconsistency Value based on the MI inconsistency
measure (S IMI ).
We ﬁrst show that this measure can be alternatively deﬁned from a function based on minimal inconsistent sets, before
stating additional logical properties of this measure, and ﬁnally stating the logical characterization.
9.1. S IMI as a minimal inconsistent set value
As minimal inconsistent sets are the places in the bases where the inconsistencies lie in, they can be a good starting
point to deﬁne inconsistency values.
Consider the following inconsistency value (for more details on measures based on minimal inconsistent sets see [25]).
Deﬁnition 16. MIVC is deﬁned as follows:
MIVC (K ,α) =
∑
M∈MI(K ) s.t. α∈M
1
|M|
Basically for each formula belonging to a minimal inconsistent set M the formula receives a penalty (i.e. blame or
responsibility) inversely proportional to its size ( 1|M| ). So the value associated to a formula is the sum of all these local
penalties.
And in fact this method that computes the value of each formula by looking successively (and uniquely) to all minimal
inconsistent subsets is an alternative deﬁnition of the SIV S IMI .
Proposition 8. S IMIα (K ) = MIVC (K ,α).
This result is interesting since computing Shapley values is a computationally diﬃcult task. And this alternative deﬁnition
can give us an eﬃcient practical way to compute the result of S IMI . Based on SAT solvers, different works have studied the
problem of identifying minimal inconsistent subsets (called in these works Minimally Unsatisﬁable Subformulas or MUS).
Although the identiﬁcation problem is computationally hard, since checking whether a set of clauses is a MUS or not is
DP-complete, and checking whether a formula belongs to the set of MUSes of a base, is in Σ P2 [16]; it seems that ﬁnding
each MUS can be practically feasible [20,21].
The other interest of this result is that it is useful to state the logical characterization of S IMI .
9.2. Logical properties of IMI
First let us remark that the IMI basic inconsistency measure satisﬁes two additional properties:
Proposition 9. IMI satisﬁes:
• If MI(K ∪ K ′) = MI(K ) ⊕ MI(K ′), then I(K ∪ K ′) = I(K )+ I(K ′) (MinInc separability)
• If M ∈ MI(K ), then I(M) = 1 (MinInc)
The ﬁrst property basically expresses the fact that the inconsistency measure depends only on the minimal inconsistent
subsets, so that if we can partition the belief base in two subbases without “breaking” any minimal inconsistent subset,
then the global inconsistency measure is the sum of the inconsistency measure of the two subbases.
The second property really depicts the MI inconsistency measure behaviour, expressing the fact that all minimal incon-
sistent subset are considered equally.
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We wrote in Section 8 that a direct translation of the Additivity axiom of Shapley’s characterization has little meaning
for inconsistency values. Let us recall this axiom. Let v and w be two coalitional games:
• Si(v + w) = Si(v) + Si(w) (Additivity)
As in this work we use basic inconsistency measures instead of coalitional games, a direct translation of this property
would give (let I and J be two basic inconsistency measures):
• S I+ Jα (K ) = S Iα(K ) + S Jα(K ) (Add1)
But ﬁrst, it is strange to add different measures of inconsistency that give different evaluation of the same situation, so
the addition S Iα(K ) + S Jα(K ) has little meaning. But also it is hard to ﬁnd a deﬁnition of what could be the added measure
“I + J ”. So this translation seems to lead nowhere.
Still, we can express another kind of additivity property:
• S Iα(K ∪ K ′) = S Iα(K ) + S Iα(K ′) (Add2)
So this translation considers the “addition” of two different bases (the set union). But this formulation is not satisfactory
because it forgets the fact that new conﬂicts can appear when making the union of the two bases.
So we want this property to hold only when joining two bases does not create any new inconsistencies. This leads to
the following Pre-Decomposability property3:
• If MI(K ∪ K ′) = MI(K ) ⊕ MI(K ′), then S Iα(K ∪ K ′) = S Iα(K ) + S Iα(K ′) (Pre-Decomposability)
The condition ensures that there will be no new conﬂicts (minimal inconsistent sets) when the two bases are joined.
When this is the case, then we ask this additivity property to hold.
This property is useful only when one can split a base into two subbases without breaking minimal inconsistent sets.
This is not always possible. So we need a slightly more general property:
• If |MI(K1 ∪ · · · ∪ Kn)| = |MI(K1)| + · · · + |MI(Kn)|, then S Iα(K1 ∪ · · · ∪ Kn) = S Iα(K1) + · · · + S Iα(Kn) (Decomposability)
The Decomposability property says that if we can split the minimal inconsistent sets into several subbases, then we can
apply additivity on these subbases.
It is easy to see that the Pre-Decomposability property is implied by the Decomposability property.
Note that this possibility of interaction between the subgames that is not taken into account in the usual Additivity
condition, is one of the criticisms about this condition. Let us quote for instance the following paragraph from [40]:
The last condition is not nearly so innocent as the other two. For although v + w is a game composed from v and w , we
cannot in general expect it to be played as if it were the two separate games. It will have its own structure which will
determine a set of equilibrium outcomes which may be different from those for v and w . Therefore, one might very well
argue that its a priori value should not necessarily be the sum of the values of the two component games. This strikes
us as a ﬂaw in the concept value, but we have no alternative to suggest.
In our framework the interaction between the bases is simply the new logical conﬂicts that appears when joining the
bases, that allows us to say when this addition can hold, and when it is not sensible.
9.4. Logical characterization of S IMI
We can now state the logical characterization of S IMI .
Proposition 10. An inconsistency value satisﬁes Distribution, Symmetry, Minimality, Decomposability and MinInc if and only if it is
the MI Shapley Inconsistency Value S IMIα .
This result means that the Shapley Inconsistency Value S IMIα is completely characterized by ﬁve simple and intuitive
axioms.
3 The property of Pre-Decomposability was called Decomposability in [25].
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10. Applications of the SIVs
As the measures we deﬁne allow us to associate with each formula its degree of responsibility for the inconsistency of
the base, they can be potentially useful for a lot of different reasoning or deliberative tasks. They can be in particular used
to guide any paraconsistent reasoning, or any repair of the base. Let us quote three such possible uses for inference and
belief change operators. The ﬁrst example is for paraconsistent inference. The second one is about belief revision and the
last one for negotiation.
10.1. Reasoning with inconsistent beliefbases
We show in this section how we can take an inconsistent beliefbase, and use the measure of inconsistency to prioritize
the formulae in the beliefbase, so that a paraconsistent consequence relation can be used with the belief.
There are some, but not many, inference relations from maximal consistent subsets where the base is not stratiﬁed. The
main ones are skeptical, credulous and argumentative inference relations. See [4] for a survey. There are more possibilities
when the bases are stratiﬁed, with some formulas being more important than others [11,3,14]. But these approaches need an
additional kind of information: the stratiﬁcation. It is not a problem when such information is available from the application.
But when the only information is a non-stratiﬁed base, i.e. a set of formulas, these approaches are of no use. In order to use
them we need a means to induce a stratiﬁcation from the ﬂat (non-stratiﬁed) base. One approach to induce a stratiﬁcation
from a ﬂat base is based on the speciﬁcity principle used for defaults such as in rational closure [38] and in System Z [47].
But this process gives a special status to implication, that is considered as a default rule, so it is not syntax independent
(a formula a → b will be treated differently than the formula ¬a ∨ b). Another approach is to use a tuple of formulae as
input (as in knowledge merging) where each formula can occur multiple times in the tuple (see for example [13,26]). For
this, a merged knowledge base is obtained by taking into account the degree of support that each candidate for the merged
knowledge base receives from input formulae. Furthermore, this degree of support gives a preference (or priority) over the
formulae in the merged knowledge that can be used to stratify them in the output.
However, there does not appear to be proposal for stratifying a set of formulae where the input is a set of formulae
of propositional logic. But Shapley Inconsistency Values can be used to deﬁne such a stratiﬁcation. The idea is simple:
take the set of formulae and compute their Shapley Inconsistency Values. This allows us to deﬁne a stratiﬁcation from less
inconsistent formulas to more inconsistent ones. Then this stratiﬁcation can be used as input for one of the numerous infer-
ence relations for stratiﬁed bases [11,3,14]. This allows us to extend the usual approaches to reasoning with inconsistency
in a very natural way, and to deﬁne a whole set of different inference relations for ﬂat bases by choosing one Shapley
Inconsistency Value and one (stratiﬁed) inference relation.
10.2. Iterated revision and transmutation policies
The problem of belief revision is to incorporate a new piece of information that is more reliable than (and conﬂicting
with) the old beliefs of the agent. This problem has received a nice answer in the work of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and
Makinson [1] in the one-step case. But when one wants to iterate revision, there are numerous problems and no deﬁnitive
answer has been reached in the purely qualitative case [15,17]. Using a partially quantitative framework, some proposals
have given interesting results (see e.g. [54,51]). Here “partially quantitative” means that the incoming piece of information
needs to be labeled by a degree of conﬁdence denoting how strongly we believe it. The problem in this framework is to
justify the use of such a degree, what does it mean exactly and where does it come from. One possibility is to use an
inconsistency measure (or a composite measure computed from an information measure [39,36,32] and an inconsistency
measure) to determine this degree of conﬁdence. We can then use the partially quantitative framework to derive revision
operators with a nice behaviour (w.r.t. [15,5,30]). In this setting, since the degree attached to the incoming information
is not a given data, but computed directly from the information itself and the agent policy (behaviour with respect to
information and contradiction, encoded by a composite measure) then the problem of the justiﬁcation of the meaning of
the degrees is avoided.
Another possible use of the inconsistency measures for belief revision is that they allow to deﬁne non-prioritized belief
revision operators [23]. One can deﬁne several revision policies for the agent. We can for instance decide that an agent
accepts a new piece of information only if it brings a lot of information and few contradictions, etc.
10.3. Negotiation
The problem of negotiation has been investigated recently under the scope of belief change tools [6–8,55,41,37,19]. The
problem is to deﬁne operators that take as input belief proﬁles (vectors of formulae4) and that produce a new belief proﬁle
4 More exactly belief proﬁles are vectors of belief bases. We use this simplifying assumption just for avoiding technical details here.
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conciliation operators is to use an iterative process where at each step a set of formulae is selected. These selected formulae
are logically weakened. The process stops when one reaches a consensus, i.e. a consistent belief proﬁle.5 Many interesting
operators can be deﬁned when one ﬁxes the selection function (the function that selects the formulae that must be weaken
at each round) and the weakening method. In [37] the selection function is based on a notion of distance. It can be sensible
if such a distance is meaningful in a particular application. If not, it is only an arbitrary choice. It would then be sensible
to choose instead one of the inconsistency measures we deﬁned in this paper. So the selection function would choose the
formulae with the highest inconsistency value. These formulae are clearly the more problematic ones. More generally SIVs
can be used to deﬁne new belief merging methods, and guide other negotiation-like operators.
11. Conclusion
We have proposed in this paper a new framework for deﬁning inconsistency values. The SIV values we introduce allow
us to take into account the distribution of the inconsistency among the formulae of the belief base and the variables of the
language. This is, as far as we know, the only deﬁnition that allows us to take both types of information into account, thus
allowing to have a more precise picture of the inconsistency of a belief base. The perspectives of this work are numerous.
First, as sketched in the previous section, the use of inconsistency measures, and especially the use of Shapley Inconsistency
Values, can be valuable for several belief change operators, for instance for modeling of negotiation. The Shapley value is
not the only solution concept for coalitional games, so an interesting question is to know if other solution concepts (for a
review of other values see [44]) can be sensible as a basis for deﬁning other inconsistency measures. But the main way of
research opened by this work is to study more closely the connections between other notions of (cooperative) game theory
and the logical modeling of belief change operators.
12. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. Clearly consistency is satisﬁed by deﬁnition.
To show monotony is direct. If K ∪ K ′ is consistent, then K alone is also consistent, so Id(K ∪ K ′) = Id(K ) = 0, otherwise
K ∪ K ′ is not consistent, so Id(K ∪ K ′) = 1 by deﬁnition, so Id(K ∪ K ′) Id(K ). So in either case Id(K ∪ K ′) Id(K ).
To show free formula independence proceed by cases: If K is consistent, then Id(K ) = Id(K \ {α}) = 0 by deﬁnition,
otherwise K is not consistent, but as by hypothesis α is a free formula of K , this implies that K \ {α} is not consistent. Then
Id(K ) = Id(K \ {α}) = 1 by deﬁnition. So in either case Id(K ) = Id(K \ {α}).
To show dominance, ﬁrst if K ∪ {β} is consistent, then Id(K ∪ {β}) = 0, so Id(K ∪ {α})  Id(K ∪ {β}). Now, if K ∪ {β}
is not consistent. By hypothesis α  β , this implies that Cn(K ∪ {β}) ⊆ Cn(K ∪ {α}). So K ∪ {α} is not consistent too. Then
Id(K ∪ {α}) = Id(K ∪ {β}) = 1. So also in this case we have Id(K ∪ {α}) Id(K ∪ {β}). 
Proof of Proposition 4. To show consistency, note that K is consistent if and only if MI(K ) = ∅. So K is consistent if and
only if IMI(K ) = |MI(K )| = 0.
To show monotony, note that if M ∈ MI(K ), then for any K ′ , M ∈ MI(K ∪ K ′). So |MI(K )|  |MI(K ∪ K ′)|. That means
IMI(K ) IMI(K ∪ K ′).
For free formula independence, if α is a free formula of K , this means that α does not belong to any minimal inconsis-
tent set of K . So MI(K ) = MI(K \ {α}). So IMI(K ) = IMI(K \ {α}).
For dominance, as α  β , then for any M ∈ MI(K ∪ {β}), either β /∈ M or β ∈ M . If β /∈ M , then M ∈ MI(K ), and so
M ∈ MI(K ∪ {α}). Otherwise β ∈ M , and so M \ {β} ∪ {α} ∈ MI(K ∪ {α}). So this means that |MI(K ∪ {α})| |MI(K ∪ {β})|, or
equivalently IMI(K ∪ {α}) IMI(K ∪ {β}). 
Proof of Proposition 5. For consistency note that if K is consistent, then K has at least one (classical) model. This model is
also a LPm model of K . So minω∈ModLP(K ){|ω!|} = 0 since this classical model does not map any variable to the inconsistent
truth value. So ILPm (K ) = 0. If K is not consistent, then K has no classical model. So any LPm model of K maps at least one
variable to the inconsistent truth value, so minω∈ModLP(K ){|ω!|} 1, so ILPm (K ) = 0.
For monotony, note that by deﬁnition of LPm models ModLP(K ∪ K ′) ⊆ ModLP(K ). So minω∈ModLP(K∪K ′){|ω!|} 
minω∈ModLP(K ){|ω!|}. So ILPm (K ∪ K ′) ILPm (K ).
For dominance, if α  β , this means that ModLP(K ∪ {α}) ⊆ ModLP(K ∪ {β}). So minω∈ModLP(K∪{α}){|ω!|} 
minω∈ModLP(K∪{β}){|ω!|}, and ILPm (K ∪ {α}) ILPm (K ∪ {β}).
For safe formula independence, for each model, w ∈ ModLP(K \ {α}) such that |w!| is minimal, there is a model w ′ ∈
ModLP(K ) such w and w ′ agree on the atoms occurring in K \ {α} and for the atoms not occurring in K \ {α} (i.e. those
occurring in α), the assignment by w ′ is in {T,F} (i.e. w ′ does not assign B to these atoms by), and hence, |w!| = |w ′!|.
Furthermore, for each w ′ ∈ Mod(K ) such that |w ′!| is minimal, there is a model w ∈ Mod(K ) such w and w ′ agree on
5 A belief proﬁle is consistent if the conjunction of its formulae is consistent.
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|w!| = |w ′!|. Therefore, if α is a safe formula in K , then ILPm (K ) = ILPm (K \ {α}). 
Proof of Proposition 6. To show distribution, let us recall that
S Iα(K ) =
∑
C⊆K
(c − 1)!(n − c)!
n!
(
I(C) − I(C \ {α}))
= 1
n!
∑
σ∈σn
I
(
pασ ∪ {α}
)− I(pασ )
where σn is the set of possible permutations on K¯ , and pασ = {β ∈ K | σ(β) < σ(α)}. Now∑
α∈K
S Iα(K ) =
∑
α∈K
1
n!
∑
σ∈σn
I
(
pασ ∪ {α}
)− I(pασ )
= 1
n!
∑
σ∈σn
∑
α∈K
I
(
pασ ∪ {α}
)− I(pασ )
Now note that we can order the elements of K accordingly to σ when computing the inside sum, and this gives:
= 1
n!
∑
σ∈σn
[
I
({ασ(1), . . . ,ασ(n)})− I({ασ(1), . . . ,ασ(n−1)})]
+ [I({ασ(1), . . . ,ασ(n−1)})− I({ασ(1), . . . ,ασ(n−2)})]
+ · · · + [I({ασ(1)})− I(∅)]
= 1
n!
∑
σ∈σn
I
({ασ(1), . . . ,ασ(n)})− I(∅)
= 1
n! n! I(K )
= I(K )
To show symmetry, assume that there are α,β ∈ K s.t. for all K ′ ⊆ K s.t. α,β /∈ K ′ , I(K ′ ∪ {α}) = I(K ′ ∪ {β}).
Now by deﬁnition
S Iα(K ) =
∑
C⊆K
(c − 1)!(n − c)!
n!
(
I(C) − I(C \ {α}))
Let us show that S Iα(K ) = S Iβ(K ) by showing (by cases) that the elements of the sum are the same:
• If α /∈ C and β /∈ C , then I(C) = I(C \ {α}) = I(C \ {β}), so I(C) − I(C \ {α}) = I(C) − I(C \ {β}).
• If α ∈ C and β ∈ C , then note that by hypothesis, as α,β /∈ C \ {α,β}, we deduce that I(C \ {α}) = I(C \ {β}). So
I(C) − I(C \ {α}) = I(C) − I(C \ {β}).
• If α ∈ C and β /∈ C . Then I(C) − I(C \ {β}) = 0, and let us denote I(C) − I(C \ {α}) = a. Let us denote C = C ′ ∪ {α} with
C ′ ∩ {α} = ∅, and C ′′ = C ′ ∪ {β}. Now notice that C ′′ = C ′′ \ {α} so I(C ′′) − I(C ′′ \ {α}) = 0. We can deduce I(C ′ ∪ {α}) =
I(C ′ ∪ {β}) by the hypothesis, and hence I(C) = I(C ′′). Also we can deduce I(C \ {α}) = I(C ′′ \ {β}) by the hypothesis.
Therefore, we also have I(C ′′) − I(C ′′ \ {β}) = a.
Hence there is a bijection F : ℘(K ) → ℘(K ) such that if α ∈ C and β /∈ C , then F (C) = C \ {α} ∪ {β} otherwise F (C) = C .
So using this bijection, we have that for all C ⊆ K , I(C)− I(C \{α}) = I(F (C))− I(F (C)\{β}). Hence, ∑C⊆K I(C)− I(C \{α}) =∑
C⊆K I(F (C))− I(F (C) \ {β}). Also, since F is a bijection on ℘(K ),
∑
C⊆K I(C)− I(C \ {β}) =
∑
C⊆K I(F (C))− I(F (C) \ {β}).
Therefore,
∑
C⊆K I(C) − I(C \ {α}) =
∑
C⊆K I(C) − I(C \ {β}). Hence, S Iα(K ) = S Iβ(K ).
To show the minimality property, just note that if α is a free formula of K , then by the free formula independence
property of the basic inconsistency measure we have that for every C ⊆ K , such that α ∈ C , I(C) = I(C \ α), so I(C) −
I(C \α) = 0. Straightforwardly if α /∈ C , I(C) = I(C \α). So the whole expression S Iα(K ) =
∑
C⊆K
(c−1)!(n−c)!
n! (I(C) − I(C \ {α}))
sums to 0.
Finally, to show dominance we will proceed in a similar way as to show symmetry. Assume that α,β ∈ K are such that
α  β and α  ⊥. Then, by the dominance property of the underlying basic inconsistency measure, we know that for all
C ⊆ K , I(C ∪ {α}) I(C ∪ {β}). Now by deﬁnition of the SIV S Iα(K ) =
∑
C⊆K
(c−1)!(n−c)!
n! (I(C) − I(C \ {α})). Let us show that
S Iα(K ) S Iβ(K ) by showing (by cases) that the elements of the ﬁrst sum are greater or equal to the corresponding elements
of the second one:
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• If α ∈ C and β ∈ C , then let us deﬁne C ′ to be such that C \ {α} = C ′ ∪ {β}. So we also have C \ {β} = C ′ ∪ {α}. Now note
that by hypothesis I(C ′ ∪ {β}) I(C ′ ∪ {α}), so I(C \ {α}) I(C \ {β}). Hence I(C) − I(C \ {α}) I(C) − I(C \ {β}).
• If α ∈ C and β /∈ C . Then I(C) − I(C \ {β}) = 0. Let us denote C = C ′ ∪ {α} where C ′ ∩ {α} = ∅, and C ′′ = C ′ ∪ {β}. Now
notice that I(C ′′) − I(C ′′ \ {α}) = 0. So I(C ′′) − I(C ′′ \ {α}) I(C) − I(C \ {β}). Note that I(C ′′ \ {β}) = I(C \ {α}) = I(C ′).
As we can deduce I(C) I(C ′′) by the hypothesis, we also have I(C) − I(C \ {α}) I(C ′′) − I(C ′′ \ {β}).
As with symmetry, we can then obtain a bijection that allows us to show dominance. 
Proof of Proposition 7. To prove consistency note that if K is consistent, then for every C ⊆ K , I(C) = 0 (this is a direct
consequence of the consistency property of the underlying basic inconsistency measure). Then for every α ∈ K , S Iα(K ) = 0.
Hence Sˆ I (K ) = maxα∈K S Iα(K ) = 0. For the only if direction, by contradiction, suppose that Sˆ I (K ) = 0 and that K is not
consistent. As K is not consistent, then by the consistency property of the underlying basic inconsistency measure I(K ) =
a = 0. By the distribution property of the SIV we know that ∑α∈K S Iα(K ) = a = 0, then ∃α ∈ K such that S Iα(K ) > 0, so
Sˆ I (K ) =maxα∈K S Iα(K ) > 0. Contradiction.
To show the free formula independence property, just notice that for any formula β that is a free formula of K ∪{β}, it is
also a free formula of every one of its subsets. It is easy to see from the deﬁnition that for any α ∈ K , S Iα(K ) = S Iα(K ∪ {β}).
This is easier if we consider the second form of the deﬁnition: S Iα(K ) = 1n!
∑
σ∈σn I(p
α
σ ∪ {α})− I(pασ ) where σn is the set
of possible permutations on K¯ . Now note that for S Iα(K ∪ {β}), the free formula does not bring any contradiction, so it
does not change the marginal contribution of any other formula. Let us call the extensions of a permutation σ on K by β ,
all the permutations of K ∪ {β} whose restriction on elements of K is identical to σ , i.e. an extension of σ = (α1, . . . ,αn)
by β is a permutation σ ′ = (α1, . . . ,αi, β,αi+1, . . . ,αn). Now note that there are n + 1 such extensions, and that if σ ′ is
an extension of σ , I(pασ ∪ {α}) − I(pασ ) = I(pασ ′ ∪ {α}) − I(pασ ′ ). So S Iα(K ∪ {β}) = 1(n+1)! (n + 1)
∑
σ∈σn I(p
α
σ ∪ {α})− I(pασ )
= 1n!
∑
σ∈σn I(p
α
σ ∪ {α})− I(pασ ) = S Iα(K ). Since for any α ∈ K , we have S Iα(K ) = S Iα(K ∪{β}), we can also get Sˆ Iα(K ∪{α}) =
Sˆ I (K ).
The upper bound property is stated by rewriting I(K ) as
∑
α∈K S Iα(K ) with the distribution property of the SIV, and
by recalling the deﬁnition of Sˆ I (K ) as maxα∈K S Iα(K ). Now by noticing that for every vector a = (a1, . . . ,an), maxai∈a ai ∑
ai∈a ai , we conclude maxα∈K S
I
α(K )
∑
α∈K S Iα(K ), i.e. Sˆ I (K ) I(K ).
To show isolation the if direction is straightforward: As α is inconsistent, K is inconsistent, and by the consistency
property of the underlying basic inconsistency measure we know that I(K ) > 0. By the free formula property of SIV, for
every free formula β of K we have S Iβ(K ) = 0. As by the distribution property we have
∑
α∈K S Iα(K ) = I(K ), this means that
S Iα(K ) = I(K ), and that Sˆ I (K ) =maxα∈K S Iα(K ) = S Iα(K ). So Sˆ I (K ) = I(K ) > 0. For the only if direction suppose that Sˆ I (K ) =
I(K ), that means that maxα∈K S Iα(K ) = I(K ). But, by the distribution property we know that I(K ) =
∑
α∈K S Iα(K ). So it
means that maxα∈K S Iα(K ) =
∑
α∈K S Iα(K ) = I(K ). There exists α such that S Iα(K ) = I(K ) (consequence of the deﬁnition of
the max), and if there exists a β = α such that S Iβ(K ) > 0, then
∑
α∈K S Iα(K ) > I(K ). Contradiction. So it means that there
is α such that S Iα(K ) = I(K ) and for every β = α, S Iβ(K ) = 0. That means that every β is a free formula, and that α is
inconsistent. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Let us ﬁrst show the following lemma that will be useful in the proof.
Lemma 1. If a simple game in coalitional form on a set of players N = {1, . . . ,n} is deﬁned by a single winning coalition C ′ ⊆ N, i.e.:
v(C) =
{
1 if C ′ ⊆ C
0 otherwise
Then the corresponding Shapley value is:
Si(v) =
{
0 if i /∈ C ′
1
|C ′| if i ∈ C ′
Proof of Lemma 1. By (Dummy) we get that if i /∈ C ′ , then Si(v) = 0. By (Eﬃciency) we know that the outcome of the grand
coalition N must be shared in the sum of the Shapley values of the players:
∑
i∈N Si(v) = 1. Since for players i /∈ C ′ we
know that Si(v) = 0, it means that this has to be split between the members of C ′ . So ∑i∈C ′ Si(v) = 1. Now by (Symmetry)
we get that for all i, j ∈ C ′ , we have Si(v) = S j(v). So this implies that if i ∈ C ′ , then Si(v) = 1|C ′ | .
Let us now state the result. First suppose that α is a free formula of K , then we have immediately by (Minimality) that
S IMIα (K ) = 0. We also have immediately by deﬁnition that MIVC (K ,α) = 0. So the equality is satisﬁed in this case.
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where Mˆ is the following characteristic function
Mˆ(C) =
{
1 if M ⊆ C
0 otherwise
Let us denote by Mˆ(K ) the game in coalitional form deﬁned from K and the characteristic function Mˆ .
So now let us start from the MI Shapley Inconsistency Value:
S IMIα (K ) =
∑
C⊆K
(c − 1)!(n − c)!
n!
(
IMI(C) − IMI
(
C \ {α}))
=
∑
C⊆K
(c − 1)!(n − c)!
n!
( ∑
M∈MI(K )
Mˆ(C) −
∑
M∈MI(K )
Mˆ
(
C \ {α}))
=
∑
C⊆K
(c − 1)!(n − c)!
n!
( ∑
M∈MI(K )
(
Mˆ(C) − Mˆ(C \ {α})))
=
∑
C⊆K
∑
M∈MI(K )
(c − 1)!(n − c)!
n!
(
Mˆ(C) − Mˆ(C \ {α}))
=
∑
M∈MI(K )
∑
C⊆K
(c − 1)!(n − c)!
n!
(
Mˆ(C) − Mˆ(C \ {α}))
=
∑
M∈MI(K )
Sα
(
Mˆ(K )
)
Now note that by Lemma 1 we have Sα(Mˆ(K )) = 1|M| .
That gives S IMIα (K ) =
∑
M∈MI(K ) 1|M| = MIVC (K ,α). 
Proof of Proposition 10. To prove that the MI Shapley Inconsistency Value satisﬁes the logical properties is easy. (Distribu-
tion), (Symmetry), (Minimality) are satisﬁed by all Shapley Inconsistency Values (Proposition 6).
So it remains to show (Decomposability) and (MinInc). (MinInc) is satisﬁed by deﬁnition since IMI(M) = |MI(M)| = 1 for
any M ∈ MI(K ).
For (Decomposability), note that the hypothesis |MI(K1 ∪ · · · ∪ Kn)| = |MI(K1)|+ · · ·+ |MI(Kn)| implies that every minimal
inconsistent set of K1 ∪ · · · ∪ Kn is exactly in one Ki . So for each M ∈ MI(K1 ∪ · · · ∪ Kn), then ∃i s.t. M ∈ MI(Ki) and ∀ j = i
M /∈ MI(K j). So from the hypothesis we obtain∑
M∈MI(K1∪···∪Kn)
1
|M| =
∑
M∈MI(K1)
1
|M| + · · · +
∑
M∈MI(Kn)
1
|M| (1)
And from Proposition 8 we know that
S IMIα (K ) =
∑
M∈MI(K ) s.t. α∈M
1
|M|
That means that Eq. (1) is equivalent to
S IMIα (K1 ∪ · · · ∪ Kn) = S IMIα (K1) + · · · + S IMIα (Kn)
For the converse implication suppose that we have an inconsistency value that satisﬁes (Distribution), (Symmetry), (Min-
imality), (Decomposability) and (MinInc). We want to show that it is the MI Shapley Inconsistency Value. From the use of
(Minimality) and (Decomposability) we have that
S Iα(K ) =
∑
M∈MI(K )
S Iα(M)
Now for each M if α /∈ M we have by (Minimality) that S Iα(M) = 0. And if α ∈ M then we have by (Distribution)∑
α∈M S Iα(M) = I(M). And by (Symmetry) we have that ∀α,β ∈ M , S Iα(M) = S Iβ(M). So we obtain that
∀α ∈ M, S Iα(M) =
I(M)|M|
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S Iα(K ) =
∑
M∈MI(K ) s.t. α∈M
I(M)
|M|
Now by (MinInc) we know that for all M ∈ MI(K ), I(M) = 1. That gives
S Iα(K ) =
∑
M∈MI(K ) s.t. α∈M
1
|M|
That is the deﬁnition of MI Shapley Inconsistency Value. 
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